It may be difficult to remember, but 20 years ago, before the Oslo Accords, there was no Separation Fence in Israel; there was not a huge store of missiles and rockets in the Gaza Strip and there were not security guards at the entrance to every café, shopping mall or kindergarten. A rash decision coupled with unwarranted euphoria dramatically changed our lives, introducing thousands of terrorists complete with their weapons into our country. For all practical purposes, the Oslo Accords placed the State of Israel on the track of the Phased Plan  for its destruction. The painful awakening that stopped the continuation of the planned process has not yet essentially changed the mindset that brought the Oslo Accords to the world. The Oslo Process  continues, with the mindset that Israel is an ‘occupier’ that must reimburse the ‘locals’ in exchange for the land that it took from them, or that it must disengage from those areas – still prevalent. According to this thinking, the areas Israel captured in the Six Day War – the ancestral Homeland of the Jewish People – must be given up in order to acquire international recognition and peace from our enemies.
This paper aims to provide the public and the decision makers in Israel with important information on the heavy economic price that we have paid and continue to pay for remaining on this path.
It is important to remember that Manhigut Yehudit in its previous incarnation as the ‘Zo Artzeinu’ movement stood at the forefront of the struggle against the Oslo Accords and throughout the years presented an alternative to the Oslo mindset. We proposed the encouragement of Arab emigration from the Land of Israel by giving them a generous grant to facilitate their emigration. This proposal stemmed from the recognition that this is our Land. Now it is clear that this proposal was and is correct from an ethical and security standpoint and is also excellent from an economic standpoint. This report will show that the Oslo Accords have cost the State of Israel close to one trillion shekels (one thousand billion shekels) so far, and counting. With this sum we could have promised three and a half million Arabs their annual income for thirty years  in exchange for voluntary emigration. 
The contraction of the Arab population and the isolation of the Israel’s enemies would allow Israel to annex all of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, settling those areas and making them flourish – instead of turning them into weapons warehouses and breeding grounds for terror that threaten Israel’s citizens on a daily basis.
I wish to thank our friend, Uri Noi, who rose to the challenge presented to him by MK and Deputy Speaker of the Knesset Moshe Feiglin to examine the price of the Oslo Accords. Uri professionally gathered the statistics, analyzed the numbers and wrote. Most of this research project is the fruit of his labors.
A special thanks to Shai Malkah, Director of Manhigut Yehudit and to Shmuel Sackett, Manhigut Yehudit’s International Director, whose outreach allows Manhigut Yehudit’s Research and Development division to work.
Director of Research and Development
In the summer of 5753 (1993), 20 years ago, Yitzchak Rabin and Shimon Peres – representing Israel – and Yasser Arafat and Muhammad Abbas – representing the Palestine Liberation Organization – signed the Oslo Accords.
Among other clauses, the Accords included mutual ‘recognition’ and the announcement of the cessation of violence between the sides. The Oslo Accords were supposed to be the basis for true and lasting peace between Israel and the ‘Palestinians. In other words, the Oslo Accords were supposed to herald the end of the conflict.
From a practical (territorial, legal, etc.) perspective, the Accords were not final. They included Israeli retreat from the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Later, additional accords were signed, following which Israel retreated from much of Judea and Samaria, as well.
The Oslo Accords represented a sea change in Israeli policy:
Since the Partition Plan of 1947, following which the State of Israel was established and until the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Arab countries, particularly Jordan and Egypt, represented the ‘Palestinian’ issue toward Israel and the world as part of the diplomatic attempts to solve the Israeli-Arab conflict.
From the beginning of the Olso process in 1993, Israel recognized the existence of the ‘Palestinian nation’. It recognized its rights and the PLO as a state-like partner in the peace process. Israel transferred the control of most of the territory in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to the PLO. It authorized tens of thousands of its member, previously considered terrorists, to enter that territory in order to control them, in accordance with the Accords. Israel also armed them with Israeli weapons. Without a doubt, this is a sea change, the purpose of which was to end decades of murderous violence and to end the conflict.
Today, twenty years later, we can factually determine that the goal of the Oslo Accords was not achieved:
Since Oslo, the number of Israelis murdered by terrorists has tripled, while the number of Israelis injured has increased 18-fold in a multi-year calculation.  Since then, Israel has been dealing with terror on a daily basis.
After twenty years of negotiations, with unprecedented international involvement, the end of the ‘process’, the end of the violence and the end of the conflict have not been achieved. A terrorist entity has risen in the Gaza Strip; it threatens Israel’s southern and central regions with high trajectory weapons. In Judea and Samaria, a terrorist entity that created suicide terror arose, taking a heavy toll on Israel – until Israel re-established its control there in the Defensive Shield Operation.
Worst of all, the State of Israel now seeks legitimacy, recognition as a Jewish state, from an organization that until twenty years ago – had no legitimacy at all.
This document does not propose to give marks to the Israeli leaders who signed the Oslo Accords and continued the process in the twenty years that have passed since then. It will only examine the economic perspective of the Accords. It will detail how much the Oslo Accords have cost us until now as opposed to the much more reasonable alternative; perpetuation of the situation that existed in the 26 years before the advent of the Oslo Process: Full Israeli security and administrative control of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.
The Oslo Process has continued for 20 years. Until now, its stated goals have not been achieved. How much has this cost us?
The benchmark against which we will calculate the cost of twenty years of the Oslo Process is the situation in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip prior to the Olso Accords. Until the Accords were signed, Israel enjoyed complete security and economic control over the entire area and its borders. This afforded Israel great control over the population and accessibility to every place and person. During that period, there were no firearms in the entire area that were not licensed by the State of Israel, except for scarce weapons hidden by terrorists.
The situation after Oslo is that in much of Judea, Samaria and Gaza two separate entities function almost as states: The ‘Palestinian Authority’ in Judea and Samaria and the Hamas in Gaza. Violence stemming from these areas continues to be perpetrated against Israel:
Huge weapons caches outside of Israel’s control exist in these areas.
Due to lack of Israeli control on the ground, it is immensely more difficult and expensive to prevent terror attacks.
Terror that was not prevented takes a greater toll as it takes advantage of its control of the areas from which Israel retreated.
Calculation of the Financial Price of Oslo:
Please note that it is not possible to know the exact cost of items or situations for which no details have been made available. Within this framework, we will attempt to make a close estimate, as much as the available data allows. The following are the expenditures created by the Oslo process:
Transfer of funds to the ‘Palestinian Authority’ created by the Oslo Accords
Extra cost to Israel’s security apparatus (ISA) in the areas transferred to the ‘Palestinians’
Extra cost to IDF
Extra cost to the police and the damages of car theft
Added civilian security guards throughout Israel
Construction of the Separation Fence around the territory transferred to the ‘Palestinians’
The cost to the economy of the wounded and murdered by terrorists
The decline in tourism during the peak years of terror
The cost of the expulsion of Jews from Gush Katif
1. Transfer of Funds to the ‘Palestinian Authority’
The budget of the Palestinian Authority relies on unprecedented foreign aid in relation to the size of its population. This assistance is used mainly for massive over-employment in the vast array of security apparatuses of the Authority. In other words, Israel and the world pay huge sums annually to keep an inordinately large number of weapons bearers in the Palestinian Authority satiated and satisfied, so that they will not turn to terror. This perpetual international bribery is called “maintenance of stability”. Israel’s part in it is 1.2 billion dollars per year, which is 88 billion NIS until now, and an additional 4.2 billion shekels with every additional year.
2. Extra Cost to Israel’s Security Apparatus (ISA) in the Areas Transferred to the ‘Palestinians’
The budget of Israel’s Intelligence Services is not public knowledge. Until 2004, the budget of the ISA was concealed among the clauses of the budget reserve along with the budget of the Mossad. In real terms, this item in the budget grows on an annual basis. In 1996 it was estimated to be 2.45 billion NIS, in 1998 2.7 billion NIS and in 2004 approximately 3.75 billion NIS. In 2012 it was 6 billion NIS. In an attempt to estimate the division of this budget between the ISA and the Mossad, we examined the costs in similar countries. Apparently, the ratio is 1:2 between the Mossad and the ISA. In other words, the budget of the ISA today is approximately 4 billion NIS annually.
Until the 6 Day War, the ISA was a very small organization. Since then, security issues brought about by the ‘Palestinian’ population have caused the organization to grow and have become its main focus. In principle, the division in tasks between the secret services in Israel is as follows:
The ISA is responsible for the areas under IDF control
The Mossad is responsible for the areas not under IDF control
The Mossad is responsible for neighboring countries and the rest of the world
The sub-division into secret police, army intelligence and international espionage is common throughout the world. But the Oslo process created an anomaly in this division, as it bred a situation in which most of the terror emanates from the areas in direct contact with Israel, but not under IDF control, which prevents the ISA from working effectively on the ground.
Since Oslo, Israel must prevent terror emanating from a large and crowded area adjacent to it, but which it does not control. In addition, transfer of these areas to terror eliminated the broad human intelligence infrastructure (informers) that the ISA had painstakingly established over the 26 years before Oslo. Most of it was destroyed. Hundreds of informers were murdered and hundreds more escaped to Israel A wave of terror ensued.
The ISA was forced to use intelligence to ‘control’ the area – from the outside. While the Intelligence Corps and the Mossad gather intelligence information from the outside, their task is very different in terms of the scope of the population involved and its immediate proximity to danger.
The Oslo Accords were signed in 1993. From 1997, deep within the era of the suicide bombers that came on the heels of Oslo – and until 2004, the ISA budget grew by more than one half. This budget increase took place before the absolute exit from the Gaza Strip a year later, which created difficult new problems. In all, it is reasonable to assume that the ISA budget had to increase four-fold from its pre-Oslo rate. The budget then stabilized at its new, higher level, which covers the cost of the immense intelligence problem that was created. All in all, the increase cost approximately 37 billion NIS, and an additional 2 billion NIS annually.
3. Extra Cost to IDF
Since Israel transferred wide areas of land to ‘Palestinian’ control, the IDF invests a huge portion of its routine operations in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, as well as in the areas bordering that territory. The IDF and Border Police operated in those areas before Oslo. But since Oslo, the difficulty and the price have substantially increased because the IDF, Border Police and ISA no longer have control everywhere.
The result of the Oslo Process was a huge increase in terror. On an annual average, the number of people murdered increased three-fold. Thousands of rockets, shot over increasingly greater range, dwarfed the ‘katyusha’ phenomenon of the past. Israel invested tremendous effort to thwart terror despite the great difficulty created by Oslo. Occasionally, a major terror event brought Israel’s government to a breaking point. At that point, Israel’s government would decide on exceptional military operations against the terror. These operations would receive exceptional funding.
The following are details of the operations and the unplanned increase in the security budget in those years:
Defensive Shield Operation in Judea and Samaria (2002) – 8.6 billion NIS
In the Gaza Strip:
Operation Rainbow (May 2004) and Operation Days of Return (Oct. 2004) – 4.2 billion NIS
Operation Summer Rains (summer 2006) began with the abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit and lasted for five months on various levels, including the Second Lebanon War – 11.5 billion NIS
Operation Warm Winter (Feb. 2008) – 5.5 billion NIS
Operation Cast Lead (Jan. 2009) lasted 22 days – 9.5 billion NIS
Operation Pillar of Cloud (Nov. 2012) lasted 8 days, did not include a ground incursion into Gaza, but did include massive air strikes, reserves draft and missiles landing in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem – 9.5 billion NIS
In the year in which the Disengagement from Gush Katif was implemented, over 7 billion NIS were added to the security budget.
These sums are included in the entire expenditure of the Defense Ministry, which, according to Treasury data, increased between 1993 and 2012 from 19 billion NIS to 60 billion NIS nominally and from 40 billion to 60 billion NIS in absolute terms. The following graph presents the dramatic increase in the budget of the Defense Ministry in absolute terms (adjusted for inflation). In the years in which the defense budget was supposed to have decreased as a result of the ‘peace’ that broke out in our area and the continued weakening of the neighboring countries, the relative percentage of the defense budget within the State budget actually increased from 15% to 20% and in certain years, to 22%.
Despite the continued cut in the salaries of the IDF servicemen, which is a major element in the defense budget, as well as a deep cut in the training budget for both the standing and reserve armies (resulting in the poor performance of the IDF in the Second Lebanon War) the defense budget increased substantially. The reason for this is the necessity to continue to defend Israel from the ‘Palestinians’ from the outside, which significantly adds to the costs. Until Oslo, the ‘Palestinians’ had to make do with stabbing and rock-throwing terror, which was basically suppressed before Oslo. Since Oslo, the suicide belt has replaced the knife and the rocket and missile have replaced the rock. The terrorists had no access to more lethal weapons, because Israel was in control on the ground and was not just defending itself from the outside. The areas surrendered to the PA became warehouses for weapons of all kinds and jump-off points for terror. After the Expulsion of the Jews from Gush Katif and the abandonment of the Gaza Strip and its border with Egypt, the entire area became a huge weapons cache threatening Israel’s southern region and of late, its central region as well. This is the place to mention the Iron Dome anti-missile apparatus, which is an impressive but expensive technological development. The Iron Dome cost Israel some 900 million . While this sum is mostly paid by the US., Israel pays a steep diplomatic price in exchange.
The cumulative additional cost to the defense budget during these years has been some 300 billion NIS in real terms, and an additional 20 billion NIS annually.
Extra Cost to Police and Damages of Car Theft
Israel’s Police Department bears the heavy responsibility for safeguarding security within its borders. Since the Oslo Accords, personal security in Israel has been severely compromised – despite the fact that the Ministry for Internal Security and the Police Department subordinate to it have grown many-fold.
The theft of cars and agricultural equipment has become widespread. The burden falls on Israel’s citizens, as the cost of insurance continues to rise.
Israel’s Police is mostly busy with security and affording a ‘sense of security.’ It hardly manages to channel resources to dealing with crime, theft, robbery and the like. With the exception of car theft (to which we shall relate below) it is difficult to calculate these damages. But we can clearly see the increase in the budget of the Ministry for Internal Security. In 1993 the Ministry’s budget (adjusted for inflation) was 3.5 billion NIS (1.6 billion NIS nominally). In 1999 the budget rose to 6.4 billion NIS and in 2012 it reached 11.5 billion NIS. In real terms, the budget of the Ministry of Internal Security tripled during the 20 years of Oslo. The cumulative addition to the budget for the Minstry of Internal Security is 85 billion NIS.
This sum does not include the damage caused to Israel’s citizens from crime, which has risen sharply during the Oslo years. Another phenomenon engraved in our memories from Oslo is car theft, to which we will relate as a separate element.
Following the Oslo Accords, car theft became commonplace. The inexcusable ease with which it is possible to steal a car and within minutes to drive to safety in territory controlled by the PA, encouraged this type of theft. In 1998 the police were forced to establish a special unit, called Etgar, to deal with this problem. As is clear from the graph below, in 1997 the number of car thefts jumped to over 45,000 annually.
After the car thefts decreased to a ‘reasonable level’ the Etgar Unit was closed and then re-opened in 2006. In 2006, 53,485 cars were stolen from the territory of the State of Israel.
If we compare car theft in Israel to Germany, we see that in Israel, 15.5 times more cars are stolen, relative to the size of the population, and 26 more relative to the number of cars!
To calculate the direct damage to the Israeli economy from car theft, we must use as a basis the number of car thefts in 2013, which dropped to some 20,000 (even though that number is also very high). The number of cars stolen from 1996 (the earliest year for which we found statistics) until 2012 above the base number is close to 200,000 cars. We will multiply that number by 100,000 NIS, which is the average price of a new car, and we get the sum of 20 billion NIS. This is the cost of car theft and increased insurance premiums that fell on the shoulders of the Israeli public. This sum does not include loss of work days of the car owners and the entire defensive system built to fight the theft. This damage is a direct result of the Oslo Accords. When the State of Israel controlled the entire area, there were no cities to shelter the stolen-car-parts lots and it was not possible to travel the roads in a stolen Israeli car with a Palestinian license.
The total cost of Oslo to internal security, including car theft is 105 billion NIS.
2. Added Civilian Security Guards Throughout Israel
The phenomenon of civilian security guards every place in Israel is the result of the appearance of the suicide terror bombers in Israel. The suicide bombers appeared with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, not before. We have already described above the essential difficulty that the Oslo Process created in preventing these attacks.
The number of security guards in Israel changes slightly with the changes in the terror situation. But as long as there the security situation does not significantly improve, the phenomenon of security guards in Israel will remain a basic part of the picture. At its peak, the number of security guards in Israel was 105,000. With the relative calm, the number has dropped to 90,000 and remains stable. This branch of employment, which was practically non-existent before the Oslo Accords, reached a cost of 7 – 8 billion NIS at its peak and stabilized at some 5.5 billion shekels per year in times of ‘calm’.
The real cost of the security guards is at least double their salaries, for if there was no need for civilian guards, these guards would be part of the productive workforce. So the loss is double: tens of thousands of people who could have done productive work now work in non-productive jobs funded by the public coffers.
The cost of the civilian security guard army created on the heels of Oslo is 110 billion NIS in direct costs, and at least the same amount in the loss of jobs in which those guards could have worked. In all, 220 billion NIS until now, and another 11 billion NIS annually.
3. Construction of the Separation Fence around the Territory Transferred to the ‘Palestinians’
The suicide terror led to the Defensive Shield Operation, the establishment of an army of civilian security guards and the encirclement of the Gaza Strip with a barbed wire fence. In addition, a separation wall was erected in Judea and Samaria to block the short path that the suicide bombers had to take to reach the heart of the State of Israel.
The Separation Wall in Judea and Samaria includes security roads, guard towers, sensors and more. The cost of construction of one kilometer of wall is 10-12 million NIS. Until the end of 2007, 430 kilometers of wall were completed, at a total cost of 4.7 billion NIS.
The upkeep of the wall after its construction is included in the security budget, as discussed above.
4. The Cost to the Economy of the Wounded and Murdered by Terrorists
‘Peace’ with the ‘Palestinians’ cost us more than one thousand murdered Israelis, more than half of them in suicide bombings. In the graph below, we can clearly see how instead of peace, we got intensified terror. In the ‘Second Intifada’ more Israelis were killed in terror attacks than were killed in the War of Independence.
Israelis Murdered by Arab Terror: 1920 - 2012
If we compare the 17 years before Oslo to the 19 years after it began, we see that between 1977 and 1993, 357 Israelis were murdered in terror attacks, while between 1994 and 2012, 1159 Israelis were murdered in terror attacks. In other words, not only did the Oslo Accords not bring peace, but they clearly and directly tripled the number of Israelis murdered by terror. The peak number of murders was in 2002, in which 452 Israelis were murdered. The peak month was March 2002; 131 Israelis were murdered then in 12 suicide bombings and in almost daily attacks.
No price can be put on the value of a life that has been extinguished, and it is unpleasant to calculate the cost of this item. But ultimately, the value of the work of these fatalities is part of the price that we paid, in addition to the heavy emotional cost.
The annual GDP per person in Israel is 129,400 NIS. The fatalities were of every age. Thus, according to the career half-life that the average fatality ‘accomplished’ before he/she was murdered, which is 22 years, we are talking about loss of income of 2,846,800 NIS per fatality. Without relating to the impact on the families of those fatalities, the orphans, the hundreds of children who would have been born to those young fatalities and their future incomes – all of which were not calculated – the direct total of loss of income alone is 4 billion NIS.
In addition to the loss of life, we must add the damages to those wounded in terror attacks. In the following table we see that between 1977 and 1993, 914 people were recognized as wounded from hostile acts. From 1993 until 2012, 18,831 people have been recognized as wounded from hostile acts. The multi-year average shows an increase of 18-fold in the years of the Oslo Process.
The sum of compensation of Israel National Insurance to victims of acts of hostility during the years of the Oslo Process is 5.25 billion NIS nominally, or some 8 billion NIS after adjustment for inflation. This sum does not include loss of work days for the victims and their families and the medical care for the injured, which was long and costly for many victims.
The total cost of the Oslo fatalities and wounded is at least 12 billion NIS.
5. The Decline in Tourism During the Peak Years of Terror
Tourism is a significant factor in Israel’s economy. This industry is constantly developing its ability to better serve tourists. Thus, it is natural that tourism to Israel has constantly increased. The Oslo Accords were supposed to have been a breakthrough that would afford the tourism industry the opportunity to leap forward. In practice, however, the complete opposite resulted. The terror that conquered the streets and the photos of exploding buses kept many tourists away from Israel, and for a long period of time, even local tourism dropped to unprecedented lows.
In the graph below we can see that from 1992 an increase in visitor statistics took place. This trend reversed itself in 1995. Israel prepared for a huge influx of Christian pilgrims as the year 2000 approached. Roads were paved and hotels were built or expanded. In all, the tourism in this year reached just over the apex of 1994. As can be seen in the graph, the terror in 2000 lowered tourism to unprecedented low, from which it took the industry almost a decade to recuperate.
In 2010 the Tourism Ministry reported that the contribution of tourism to the GNP in that year was some 33 billion NIS. In that year, 2.8 million tourists visited Israel. Thus, the average contribution to the national income per tourist was some 11,700 NIS. A calculation of reasonable tourist development from 1992 –2013 as opposed to the great drops in tourism that actually occurred, as clearly seen on the graph above – shows that the loss to the Israeli economy from tourism was some 130 billion NIS.
It is important to remember that in addition to the above, there is a steady drop in tourism. This is brought about by the relentless threat of terror, as well as the constant harm to development of tourism in Judea and Samaria, which just of late has shown signs of recuperation.
Judea and Samaria are the cradle of Jewish and Christian culture. They are a sort of unspoiled ‘Israeli Tuscana’, which have yet to reach their potential. They are a short distance from the Ben-Gurion airport, the Mediterranean Sea, the Dead Sea and holy sites. They boast open spaces, a mountainous view and a dry summer climate. Their tourism potential is great and it is difficult to analyze the loss of tourism to this area. As the income from tourism is 33 billion NIS per year, the lost tourism to Judea and Samaria is at least a few billion NIS per year. But to avoid exaggeration, we will calculate the loss of tourism to Judea and Samaria as 1 billion NIS per year – or 20 billion NIS since the Oslo Accords.
The total cost of loss of tourism is estimated at 150 billion NIS.
6. The Cost of the Expulsion of Jews from Gush Katif
During the first decade of the Oslo Process, the Israeli governments transferred more and more territory to the ‘Palestinians,’ but those did not include any Jewish settlements. At the end of 2003, PM Ariel Sharon decided to unilaterally evacuate all the Jewish towns and villages in the Gush Katif bloc in the Gaza Strip and an additional four settlements in northern Samaria. His decision was implemented in the summer of 2005 and included the expulsion of thousands of Jews from their homes. The direct cost of the expulsion and compensation of the former residents of Gush Katif has been 9.5 billion NIS until 2013. 12% of the evacuees still live in temporary quarters.
The Oslo Process significantly influenced two major factors in Israel’s economy:
There is a close connection between the Oslo Process and the price of housing in Israel. The expulsion of Jews from Gush Katif combined with the construction freeze in Judea and Samaria are part of the causes for the increase in demand for housing and insufficient supply. It is no wonder that the housing protest broke out a year after the start of the housing freeze in Judea and Samaria. The worldview of the Oslo Process does not allow for widespread construction on the natural land reserves in the lowlands that run the length of Israel’s central region. Massive building in these areas would significantly lower the price of housing, as we have explained in the past. The influence of the Oslo Process on the cost of housing is poised to be greater than any of the other factors detailed in this paper. However, the calculation of this cost is by essence an estimate. We will leave it to the reader, who is well aware of the high cost of housing, to evaluate the cost himself.
Terror battered Israel’s GNP in many ways. For example, loss of many work days during emergencies. Despite the sharp rise in terror during the Oslo Process, Israel’s economy continued to flourish. We do not have statistics on the amount of damage done to the economy from loss of work days and the like. In addition, we cannot really estimate how much higher the gross domestic product would have been without the Oslo process. It is reasonable to assume that an economy that did not have to deal with these difficulties would have developed in a much better way.
Highway #1 from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was planned and built before the Oslo Accords. For that reason, parts of the highway are east of the Green Line. Planning for the express train to Jerusalem began after the Oslo Accords, with both economic and environmental implications. The cheaper, quicker option for both implementation and use would have been to lay the train rails along the route of Highway #443. This route has the best gradients for a railway. But this option was rejected out of hand because it is east of the Green Line. Israel’s government opted to invest in a megalomaniacal alternative for a railway, 44 kilometers of which runs through a tunnel and another 7 kilometers built on bridges. This damage, the result of the Oslo Process, was not calculated into the costs of Oslo. Direct damages from this option amount to 7 billion NIS. The indirect damage, which includes the major delay that resulted from choosing this option, is estimated in the tens of billions. Another similar example is Highway #6. A number of segments of this highway were moved west of the original plan so as not to go over the Green Line. Israel paid hundreds of millions of shekels for these alterations, despite the fact that the highway was built by a private company. One of the villages that suffers from this ‘alteration’ is Bat Hefer. This village is trapped between the Separation Wall from the east and the acoustic wall of Highway 6 to the west. Originally, the acoustic wall was supposed to have been to the east of the village, which would have allowed it to develop westward.
Summary and Conclusion
Twenty years after the start of the Oslo Process we can factually determine that its goal was not achieved; instead of bringing an end to terror, terror has persevered and increased. In addition, after twenty years of negotiations, the end of the process, the end of the violence and the end of the conflict have not been achieved and do not seem to be close to actualization.
The full economic cost of those components that can be calculated is:
Transfer of funds to the Palestinian Authority: 88 billion NIS
Extra cost to Israel’s security apparatus (ISA): 37 billion NIS
Extra cost to IDF : 300 billion NIS
Extra cost to the police and the damages of car theft: 105 billion NIS
Added civilian security guards throughout Israel: 220 billion NIS
Construction of the Separation Fence around the territory transferred to the ‘Palestinians’: 4.7 billion NIS
The cost to the economy of the wounded and murdered by terrorists: 12 billion NIS
The decline in tourism during the peak years of terror: 150 billion NIS
9. The cost of the expulsion of Jews from Gush Katif: 9.5 billion NIS
In all, the Oslo Process has cost us to date 933 Billion NIS.
If we divide this total into the 20 year ‘peace process’ and compare it to Israel’s budget of 406 billion NIS for 2014, we get an annual cost that is 11.4% of our national budget in each of the past twenty years.
And there is no peace.
In hindsight, Oslo is the worst economic decision ever made in Israel’s history. As opposed to the Yom Kippur War, in which it was impossible to rectify the mistake once it had been made, the Oslo Process continues to this very day – even though it can be ended. We are still expected to pay for it – not only with money, but also with the release of murderers and the loss of moral legitimacy for our existence.
Where is the money? The money is in the price that we continue to pay for the illusion that if we just surrender and pay, we will receive ‘peace’ or at least calm. The bitter truth is that we are in the midst of a violent extortion process, the price of which only increases as time goes on.
 The Oslo Process referred to in this document includes the actual signing of the accords, along with the conceptual change included in the process, in addition to the Wye Accords, the attempted Camp David Accords and the “Disengagement” and expulsion of the Jews from Gush Katif.
 The annual income per person in the PA is $1600http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3577200,00.html
 For close to 100 years, from the time that the Jews exited the Old City of Jerusalem until the establishment of the State of Israel, Jews bought land from the Arabs for large sums, thereby funding voluntary Arab emigration. There is no reason not to complete this Divine process, particularly because it benefits both sides.
 See the section on victims of terror below
 According to the exchange rate of 1 dollar = 3.5 NIS
 In his book ‘Haba Lehorgecha’ (Hebrew, 1999) pg. 259, former head of the ISA Yaakov Peri writes as follows: The ISA was forced to reorganize in advance of the IDF retreat from the Gaza Strip. This was an immense task. It was necessary to create an intelligence infrastructure adapted to the new situation on the ground…We could not ignore our obligation to ensure the safety of those residents who were discovered as informers for Israel. Many of them had tied their fate to ours many years previously. More than a few had been working with us since the Six Day War. As the retreat approached, we notified each of them that the option to relocate to Israel was available to them. We promised an Israeli identity card to all those who would choose to relocate to Israel…The amounts we paid the agents were very low by Israeli standards, but they were enough to support a large family in Gaza… As the date of the retreat approached, the informers justifiably became fearful of what the future would hold for them when the PA would take control. When the PA entered Gaza, we asked them not to harm the informers who remained there. We reminded them that not harming the informers was anchored in the agreement with the PA. However…some of the informers…were murdered, tortured, their homes were burned, their property was nationalized. Peri continues on page 260: When the Rehabilitation Authority was established, the list of informers in need of their help included 1400 names. 1200 of those were ISA informers.
 Brigadier General Yigal Slovik, Chief Armored Corps Officer: “You see armored corps soldiers who care about the sights on their rifles, because for 11 monts of the year they are busy making arrests in Judea and Samaria and not with tank drills. http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/2689/2553335
 These figures can be viewed at http://budget.msh.gov.il/#0015,2012,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0
 Even after cost reduction for the intercepting missile, there is still a huge gap between the incoming rocket and the intercepting missile. http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4358626,00.html
 These figures are from statistics provided by Israel’s National Insurance Institute, as per the table in this section.
 In 2013