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Appendix: Israel's Security Since Oslo Part 2


The Olmert Government: 4 Jan. 2006 – 31 March 2009

The Convergence Plan and Amona

The Oslo Accords destroyed many of those involved. The intimate relationship created between Arafat’s corrupt administration and Israeli negotiators, the absolute immunity from media or legal criticism, and the atmosphere of “Everything for Peace” – were enticing to dubious characters in senior positions.[1]

It was not difficult to see how the disengagement plan extricated Sharon from the range of criminal investigations opened against him and turned him into an “etrog”[2], a media favorite and admired leader.[3]

Olmert also wanted to receive such treatment, and as it turned out in retrospect, given his conviction and imprisonment, he had every reason for it.

As soon as he took office, Olmert announced the “convergence” plan, which Sharon had already declared as the platform of his party ahead of the upcoming elections - that is, the expulsion and destruction of Judea and Samaria settlements according to the format of the destruction of the Gush Katif settlements. In order to position himself clearly on the “right” side, Olmert instructed the Israel Police to use the harshest violence possible during the evacuation of settlers who had barricaded themselves in a number of permanent homes built in the settlement of Amona and were about to be demolished. The methodical manner in which the order was implemented can only be understood as a clear directive from above - Olmert wanted “harsh pictures.”[4]

But Olmert was in for a surprise. What worked well for Sharon did the opposite for Olmert. Sharon, the illustrious commander who became “an elderly and responsible grandfather,” maneuvered the settlers into a position that enabled him to evacuate them without excessive violence and managed to enjoy the best of both worlds.

Olmert, on the other hand, faced a different reality. His image was not that of a glorified general who was elected by a large majority as prime minister, but that of a shrewd evader, surrounded by corruption.[5] Without Sharon’s aura of security, his moves were not perceived by the public as sacrifice and determination, but as a cynical political maneuver.

The scenes of destruction, expulsion and sorrow, which only brought the exact opposite of what had been promised, were abhorred by the Israeli public. The youth in the settlements were also fed up with the old settler leadership and had lost faith in them after they prevented a real struggle in Gush Katif. At Amona, they were no longer satisfied with passive resistance and shouts.

The scenes of the civil war in Amona caused a sharp drop in Olmert’s popularity, which only declined further from that point.

The Elections in the PA and Hamas’ Takeover of Gaza

In January 2006, elections for the leadership of the Palestinian Authority were held under international supervision. Israel did not prevent the Hamas terror organization, which openly calls for its destruction as part of its platform and ideological foundation, from participating in the elections as a legitimate element, even though the elections were held in the territory under its control. Hamas won a large majority[6] and threw PLO men from the rooftops of Gaza buildings to their deaths, literally.

Fortunately for Abu Mazen[7] and the PLO gangs, the IDF had withdrawn completely from the Gaza Strip. Thus, the Hamas regime was prevented from implementing the clear will of the Arab voter in Judea and Samaria. For the decades since then, the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria has prevented new elections.  It governs with PLO veterans, whose continued existence depends on the IDF. At the same time, it does its best to undermine Israel’s existence in any way possible in the international arena, and continuously incites its population to carry out terror attacks.

Thus, a situation has been established in which both the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip and the PLO regime in Judea and Samaria is nourished by Israel and simultaneously makes war against it. The Israeli leadership cannot change the situation, for the rationale of Oslo fundamentally assumes the existence of a sovereign Palestinian people that has a political leadership with whom to reach a political settlement. The elimination of Hamas or the withdrawal of defense from the PLO would undermine this element of the Oslo Accords and the status of Oslo's "peace industry" will be come into question.[8]

The deterioration in security continued all this time, culminating in two attacks that included the murder and kidnapping of soldiers - Gilad Shalit in Gaza[9], and Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, Hy”d, on the Lebanese border.[10]

At that time, a rocket from Gaza hit a school in Ashkelon for the first time.[11]

Following the rocket fire from Gaza and the abduction of Gilad Shalit, the Olmert government was forced to launch Operation Summer Rains in the south, and after the abduction of the soldiers by Hezbollah, found itself fighting in the northern front as well.

The close ties between the various fronts in the war against Israel is not new. The first Lebanon War (1982) broke out immediately after the destruction of the Yamit settlements and the withdrawal from the Sinai, just as the Second Lebanon War broke out following the destruction of the Gush Katif settlements and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[12]

The Second Lebanon War

The victory over Hezbollah will give a tailwind to the convergence” - Prime Minister Ehud Olmert

The abduction of soldiers Regev and Goldwasser, Hy”d, by Hezbollah and the killing of their comrades was an isolated event for Hezbollah. It had no intention of launching a comprehensive confrontation, and there was no assumption that this would develop. What made the event a war and exposed Israel's new strategic situation following the Oslo Accords was the Israeli attack in response to the abduction.

Following the events of Amona and the drop in his popularity, Ehud Olmert tried to position himself, like Sharon, as a victorious leader. By this means, he hoped, he could mobilize the public support needed for a unilateral move to evacuate and destroy the settlements in Judea and Samaria, which would ensure the support of the Israeli media. This aspiration was a decisive factor in Olmert's decision to go to war in Lebanon, which, like the “rounds” against Hamas in Gaza, did not have achievable goals or conditions that ensured victory. It is hard to believe, but when things got complicated and the media came out against him, Olmert tried to placate it and said explicitly that: “The victory over Hezbollah will give a tailwind to the Convergence.”[13]

Chief of Staff Dan Halutz[14] convinced Olmert that the air force alone would be able to defeat Hezbollah. Olmert approved the attack, and in response all cities and towns in the north absorbed a missile attack the likes of which Israel had never known before. The fighting took 34 days. Olmert was forced to authorize the entry of ground forces when he justified the need to bring home the abducted soldiers, but, being bound by the new moral principles of Oslo[15], he severely limited the soldiers’ fighting ability and limited the entrance to no more than a few kilometers, or a kilometer from the front, when it was clear that the abductees were far beyond.

The goals of the war that Olmert defined in his Knesset speech on the sixth day of the war[16], of course, were not achieved and could not have been achieved under these conditions. In the absence of determination and the worldview necessary for a military resolution, for achieving victory, Israel finally begged for an agreement that would end the war and found itself in a political inferior position vis-à-vis Hezbollah. On August 12, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1701, which was supposed to lead to the deployment of an UN force along with the Lebanese army along the border with Israel, and to prevent Hezbollah from continuing its activities in south Lebanon.

It was clear that from the Hezbollah point of view, the decision was not worth the paper it was written on, and was merely a face-saving measure for Israel. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, however, presented the decision as a great achievement. At the same time, an attempt was made to achieve a symbolic military victory after the decision was taken (“a picture of victory” as it was called at the time). Thus, IDF soldiers were humiliated by senseless attempts to take the town of Bint Jbeil and other targets after the cease-fire decision was made. These attempts both failed, and also resulted in a heavy death toll of 33 more killed in combat and another civilian killed in the rear.

Of course, Resolution 1701 was not implemented. Hezbollah quickly took control of the area evacuated by the IDF, rehabilitated its military capabilities, and today it is ten times larger and has far greater capabilities than it had on the eve of the campaign.

44 civilians and 119 soldiers were killed in order to give what Prime Minister Olmert described a “tailwind” to the Convergence Plan, which was intended to be the completion of the Disengagement Plan - which was the outcome of the Oslo Accords and the mentality it had established in Israel.

Attack on the Syrian reactor and Operation Cast Lead

On September 6, 2007, the Air Force attacked a highly secret nuclear reactor built by North Korea for Syria. The success of this vital operation must be credited to Olmert.

The incessant rocket fire from Gaza eventually led to another ground incursion into Gaza. On  December 27, 2008, the IDF launched Operation Cast Lead, which lasted about three weeks and cost the lives of 10 soldiers and three civilians. The operation ended with a unilateral declaration of a cease-fire. As usual, rocket fire continued afterwards, albeit at a lower intensity, until the next round.

The calls for Olmert to resign in the wake of his failure to manage the war, together with the corruption scandals that were piling up one by one, eventually led to his resignation and the end of his term as prime minister. To his credit it should be said that, on the verge of ending his term, he did not yield to Hamas demands in exchange for the release of Gilad Shalit and preferred Israel’s security to the popular achievement.


The Second Netanyahu Government: 31 March 2009 – 18 March 2013

The Iranian Threat

Netanyahu had internalized Israel’s inability to reach a resolution  - a result of the Oslo Accords. The security policy of his second and third governments was characterized by lofty talk about what was happening on the southern front, as well as, and especially, about the Iranian nuclear threat. In 2005 the world reacted with amazement to the first annihilation speeches of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and expected the “nation of Auschwitz survivors”[17] to respond in the style of the attack on the Iraqi reactor[18]. However, a decade of virtuosic speeches, which effectively transferred responsibility for Israel’s security from Israel to the air forces of the “world”, the United States and England (again), has led to the loss of legitimacy for an Israeli attack.

From a situation in which Iran was seen as illegitimate and the world expected Israel to attack Iran - under much simpler military and political conditions than Israel faces today - the Israeli Prime Minister, found himself waiting outside the room where the Americans and the “world” negotiated with the Iranians. These negotiations ended with the de facto acceptance of the new reality of a nuclear Iran by the superpowers and its gradual transformation into a legitimate and central factor in regional alliances.

It is impossible not to compare the deterioration of Israel’s strategic position under Netanyahu’s leadership to the deterioration of Czechoslovakia’s position in the Munich agreement. Czechoslovakia, too, was prevented from participating in the negotiations between England and Nazi Germany, - negotiations directly related to the existential threat to its security.

As in the case of Resolution 1701 against Hezbollah, which is itself an extension of Iran, the American agreement with the Iranians will evaporate at the first opportunity. Essentially, the Netanyahu government decided to allow the Iranians to obtain a nuclear bomb, and all that remains is to gradually accustom the Israeli public to this reality.

Those who preferred defense to resolute victory against the stones of the first Intifada thirty years ago, and promised then to respond forcefully to the use of firearms, - find themselves increasingly on the defensive in a snowballing process in the face of Molotov cocktails, light weapons, rockets and long-range missiles.  Ultimately we will also be forced, in the face of nuclear weapons, to adopt a policy of defense rather than resolution. The cumbersome “dispersal” helmets worn by IDF soldiers in the first intifada turned into bullet-proof vehicles, concrete blocks, Iron Dome systems, and Arrow missiles - no more than a glorious technological barricade.[19]

Throughout the tenure of the Netanyahu government, obscure operations were publicized from time to time, which led to a delay in the Iranian nuclear program. Ranging from sophisticated computer programs that caused malfunctions in the production system, continued assassinations of scientists, and finishing with advanced spyware programs implanted in the negotiation rooms between the West and the Iranians. What is common to all this is the attempt to fight those who seek Israel’s soul - without leaving the “fingerprints” of a real military operation. A clear resolution in the style of how the Iraqi reactor was handled became illegitimate.

The secret actions of the Netanyahu government were remarkable, but Netanyahu never understood that the problem was deeper than its technical dimension. Secret actions can delay but not solve the problem - and when they alone pretend to be the solution to the open and explicit threat of destruction, they only intensify the problem.

When an Arab child curses a soldier without an open response, the slippery slope leads to the fact that a few years later, the head of state of a UN member can declare his intention to destroy Israel, without even an open response. The cause and effect in both cases is the same - the loss of legitimacy

The Holocaust of European Jewry did not begin with the outbreak of World War II in September 1939. It began in 1933, in light of the lack of open reaction to Hitler’s speeches of annihilation in the Reichstag. The nuclear threat is extremely serious, but the loss of legitimacy is vastly more serious. The physical holocaust is the result of the loss of legitimacy that preceded it.

In Oslo, Israel relinquished its right to the heart of our country, Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and together with them our justice and legitimacy. As a result, its security policy has become a “containment” policy of avoiding as much as possible the use of open force[20] and a preference for shielding and clandestine activity: the concrete blocks and the Shin Bet. So post-Oslo Israel is no longer able to decide to deal with the Iranian reactor the way pre-Oslo Israel was able to deal with the Iraqi reactor.

Bar Ilan speech

On 14 June 2009, Netanyahu gave a speech at Bar Ilan University, in which he agreed to establish a demilitarized “Palestinian” state. Netanyahu conditioned this on the Palestinians’ recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.

Twelve years after he first embraced Arafat and announced that “I found a friend,”[21] the circle was closed. From Israel’s strategic situation prior to the signing of the Oslo Accords - a point in which the US and most of the free world countries did not recognize the PLO as a legitimate political entity and partner in dialogue, did not speak of a “Palestinian” state at all, and no significant entity denied the existential legitimacy of Israel - the tables have turned. Now that Netanyahu has recognized the existence of a “Palestinian people” and its right to sovereignty in the heart of the country, he has found himself struggling for the recognition of that “people” in the very existence of a Jewish people and in its own right to the state. This reversal was not limited to relations between Israel and the “Palestinian people.” The new strategic situation created by the Oslo Accords has spread rapidly, and most of the centers of intellectual power in the Western world now support the “Palestinian” position and completely negate the legitimacy of the existence of Israel.[22]


Rocket fire in the south continues all the time. In August 2011, a deadly terrorist attack was carried out in Eilat by terrorists who left Gaza and entered the city via Sinai.

The Shalit Deal

On  October 11, 2011, the Netanyahu government approved an agreement with Hamas, according to which Israel would release 1027 dangerous prisoners, some responsible for the murder of hundreds of Israelis, in return for the release of Gilad Shalit. This was a complete collapse of the Israeli security concept, a “red line” that even the Olmert government did not dare to cross.

And why not? If you recognize that this is their land, then they are not really terrorists, but rather a kind of “freedom fighter”, whose moral righteousness trumps the fact that they do not obey the rules of warfare of the West (the Geneva Convention).

The bloody outcome of the liberation of these thousand terrorists was not long in coming.


The Third Netanyahu Government: 18 March 2013 – 14 May 2015

Prisoner release gestures

With the start of his third government, Netanyahu surrendered to heavy American pressure exerted by the Obama administration, and as a gesture to Abu Mazen and without any recompense on his part, he asked the government to pass a decision to release many other terrorists in four “stages”. The decision to implement the release was passed by the government, and three of the four “stages” took place.

The Kidnapping of the Three Boys

Mahmud Qawasmeh from Hebron was released in the Shalit deal.[23] On 12 June 2014, Kawasmeh initiated the kidnapping of the three youths from a bus stop in Gush Etzion: Gil-Ad Sha’ar, Naftali Frenkel and Eyal Yifrah – Hy”d.  Kawasmeh served as the commander of the kidnapping and murder squad. The search for the boys developed when there was no option for an operation to clean out Hamas nests in Judea and Samaria, which had grown stronger after the Shalit deal. In response, Hamas began massive rocket fire and attacks via tunnels dug from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory using the very building materials that Israel had transferred to Gaza as humanitarian aid.

Once again, Israel found itself trapped in the same Oslo trap, caught in another “round of fighting,” without a moral infrastructure that would support the fighters and without the ability to define the enemy and then designate its destruction as an objective - and therefore unable to win.

Operation Protective Edge

At the beginning of the fighting, the objective of the operation was defined as “stopping the rocket fire”.  Later, when Hamas began to attack through tunnels, the goal was changed to “liquidating the tunnels.” When the Deputy Chief of Staff was asked by then Deputy Speaker of the Knesset Moshe Feiglin to please define the enemy, he could not do so.

Tel Aviv had already been shelled for more than a month, but the senior command was unable to answer the question “who is the enemy” even during wartime.

At first the Netanyahu government issued instructions, as usual, to carry out air strikes. When these did not help, and the rocket fire only increased, a very limited ground entry was ordered. Without a clear strategic objective, IDF soldiers entered the area of destruction prepared by Hamas[24], an area that included many mazes of tunnels and a series of booby-trapped structures.  The IDF soldiers were caught between the anvil and the hammer. The anvil was the  apologetic “fighting ethics”– ethics of conquerors in a foreign land[25], and the limitation of fighting in ranges and intensities that would prevent the fall of the Hamas regime at any price (so that we would not have to give up the Oslo concept and go back to controlling Gaza). The hammer was an uninhibited enemy that knew well how to exploit the Israeli moral weakness and inability to win. The IDF soldiers were in an impossible situation.

The Israeli bombardment and shelling caused great damage and suffering to the civilian population in Gaza, but the actual rule of Hamas was carefully protected by Israel. In the end, as in Lebanon, it was Israel that was looking for ways to reach a cease-fire. When it went unanswered, it ceased fire unilaterally.

The price of Operation Protective Edge, embarked upon as a result of the abduction of the youths, which was the result of the Shalit deal, who was abducted in the Gaza Strip, which we abandoned in the disengagement plan, resulted in the deaths of 73 Israelis (including 5 civilians) and 2,271 wounded (837 civilians). Of course, since the operation, the rocket fire has resumed, tunnel mining has resumed, and Hamas’ military capabilities have been restored.[26]

One of the new characteristics of Operation Protective Edge was a parallel civil uprising by many Israeli Arabs. In the past, Israeli Arabs had been careful to keep quiet in times of war. The weakness displayed by Israel in Protective Edge ignited an uprising among Israeli Arabs, especially the Arabs of East Jerusalem.

On  October 29, 2014, an Arab resident of the Abu Tor neighborhood attempted to assassinate Temple Mount activist Rabbi Yehuda Glick[27], who was later elected to the 20th Knesset.

On  November 18, 2014, two Arab murderers from the Jerusalem neighborhood of Jabel Mukaber entered the Kehilat B’nai Torah synagogue in the Har Nof neighborhood (the westernmost neighborhood in Jerusalem). Using an ax and a butcher knife, the killers slaughtered 4 worshipers.

The Fourth Netanyahu Government: 14 May 2015 – Today 

During the fourth Netanyahu government, a new type of fighting – lone terror - was added to the varieties of terror to which we have grown accustomed since the Oslo Accords.

Israel managed to basically eliminate suicide bombings and the previous terror networks   by means of excellent intelligence, preventing most attacks before they were carried out. However, on Rosh Hashana 5775, Israel was exposed to a new phenomenon - a wave of spontaneous attacks without a central leadership and a deliberate hand that could be detected and neutralized.

The widespread incitement called on every Arab - Israeli or resident of Judea and Samaria - to decide independently and carry out a stabbing attack or a road attack. Every few hours, an Israeli was stabbed or run down by an Arab terrorists acting on his own, fighting against the Israeli “occupation”. Over the course of half a year, Israel stood helpless against the new wave of terrorism, which claimed dozens of lives.

On Purim that year, a terrorist stabbed a soldier in Hebron. He initially seemed to have been neutralized by the victim’s comrades, and was later liquidated by company medic Elor Azaria. The radical leftist B’Tselem, which filmed the liquidation of the wounded terrorist, distributed the video all over the world, and the daily wave of terrorism by individuals immediately subsided.

The prosecution of Elor Azaria on charges of manslaughter, and his eventual conviction, restored the motivation to perpetrate lone terror attacks. At the same time, it severely damaged the sense of security of IDF soldiers that in moments of truth during security incidents they would enjoy the backing of their commanders. These two factors brought about a new wave of terror attacks in Israel.

The inability to recognize the terrorist as an enemy and to treat him accordingly, and the willingness to compare him to a regular criminal, is also a direct result of the Oslo concept, and is actually one of its major features.


Interim Summary: Returning from Oslo to Identity

In the summer of 1993, the State of Israel and the “Palestine Liberation Organization” signed the Oslo Accords. The agreement included a mutual “recognition” and a declaration of an end to the violence between the sides.

Today, almost a quarter of a century later, it is possible to establish that Oslo has failed, because:

  1. Terror has not ended, but rather the opposite. The number of terror victims in Israel has since increased more than five times on a multi-year average, and terrorism has continued daily since then.

  2. While Israel has recognized and still recognizes the “Palestinian people,” and therefore also its right to a state of its own (although there is no such people, they are part of the Arab people, and say so), all the while these same “Palestinians” continue to refuse to recognize the right of the state of the Jewish people to exist as such.


This appendix reviewed the process and showed how, over the course of 24 years and ten governments, the Israeli public and its leaders have not been wise enough or courageous enough to look at reality and say: We were wrong, and we have to correct the mistake. All of the existing parties in the Knesset, including the “right wing”, offer proposals that mean staying with the mistake and continuing with it. Zehut proposes to correct the mistake of Oslo, and offers an alternative way, another solution to our security problem, and to many other problems stemming from it - in part, due to the enormous economic cost that the Oslo mistake continues to exact from us every day and every year since.

An examination of the sequence of terrorist incidents and rounds of fighting since the signing of the Oslo Accords until this day clearly shows how the agreements led to a serious deterioration in Israel’s security and strategic situation.

Government ministers predict that within a year Israel will be dragged into another round of fighting in Gaza. Without a strategic way of thinking other than Oslo, the process will lead to a new diplomatic plan along the lines of the disengagement, which in turn will lead to an escalation of violence and further deterioration of Israel’s existential legitimacy.

The rise of a strong and decisive leader in the United States - a leader who has no opposition on the right, Russia’s return to our northern border as a dominant factor under the leadership of a strong and determined leader as well, and, more importantly, the emerging alliance between the two leaders – against an Israeli leader lacking an alternative strategy to Oslo, or any opposition on the right - creates a very dangerous situation for Israel.

The need to escape from the Oslo whirlpool that is swallowing Israel has become an existential necessity, and the political-security plan of the Zehut Party is the way to do so.



[1] Azrad Lev, who dealt with financial management and financial advice to the Palestinian Authority, wrote a thick book called “Inside the Pocket of the Rais” which describes in detail the development of the phenomenon.

[2] In 2005, senior commentator Amnon Abramovich said that “Sharon should be kept as if he were on an etrog ... at least until the end of the disengagement.” As a result of his words, a new Hebrew verb appeared: “L’atreg” - which means to protect those who serve the political agenda of the media, even from criminal charges.

[3] He was revered by the Israeli left, who had hated him before, feared him, and slandered him for decades, then turned him into a “kindly grandfather,” “responsible adult,” “elder,” “last of a generation of giants” and so on.

[4] In almost identical events, years later, including the evacuation of houses in Amona in 2017, the behavior of the police was very different; the scenes of civilians overrun by police horses and indiscriminate beatings with clubs were not repeated.

[5] Olmert was suspected and even charged with various corruption cases over decades of public activity, and was eventually convicted criminally in later cases of corruption.

[6] For decades, there were those in Israel who claimed that the simple “Palestinians” do not hate Israel, and that a distinction must be made between the civilian population and the terrorists who control it. Later, the argument was that a distinction must be made between the “moderates” (the PLO that signed the Oslo Accords) and the “extremists” (Hamas).  In 2006 free and fair elections were held for the first time, and it became clear that hatred of Israel is a the general rule, and not just a matter of a handful. It was predictable, and forewarned, but the results proved it. This did not prevent the "process" supporters from finding excuses for this, and moving on.

[7] Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen, succeeded Arafat as chairman of the PLO and the PA when he died of a disease in 2004. He holds a doctorate on his work on Holocaust denial from the University of Patrice Lumumba in Moscow, and was responsible for the massacre of Israeli athletes in Munich.

[8] The Oslo agreement created a “peace industry” that includes political, military, academic, media and economic careers. These are wide circles that cling to Israeli consciousness and do not allow for new thinking.

[9] 25 June2006

[10] 12 July 2006

[11] Hamas’ full control of the Gaza Strip following Israel’s full withdrawal allowed it to extend the range of its rockets over the years to the point that during Operation Tzuk Eitan in 2014, missiles fired from the Gaza Strip were already able to hit the area between Hadera and the north and Mitzpeh Ramon in the south.

[12] The Six Day War also broke out following an Egyptian ruler’s response to events on the Israeli-Syrian border.

[13] An interview with the Associated Press, 02 August 2006.

[14] Dan Halutz was appointed chief of staff after his predecessor, Moshe Ya’alon, criticized the Disengagement Plan, and as a result, his tenure was not extended for another year, as was usually done. The implementation of the disengagement plan was Halutz's first significant task as chief of staff.

[15] According to the logic of Oslo, which perceives the Jewish-Arab conflict as territorial, “occupation” - that is, military control on the ground - is the mother of all sin. This is not only a moral injustice, it is also a political folly that invites unsustainable international pressure, encourages violence and hostility, and distances the peace that is the supreme goal. Every ground entry carries the risk of seizing the territory, which from the point of view of Oslo is almost inconceivable.

[16] The unconditional return of the abducted soldiers, and “a ceasefire - only if Hezbollah leaves.”

[17] Since its establishment, Yad Vashem has become the Israeli Holy of Holies - the Zionist “temple” - to which all VIPs who come for an official visit are brought in. The fledgling nation, fleeing from its own message, preferred to base its right of existence on the value of self-defense – “See what happens to us when we have no country”. The idea became assimilated and world consciousness naturally expected an Israeli attack on the new enemy openly preparing itself for the extermination of the Jews.

[18] The Iraqi nuclear reactor was destroyed by the Israel Air Force on 7 June 1981, at the instruction of then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin. The day after the attack, the Israeli government issued a statement, known since then as the “Begin Doctrine”, which asserted that “under no circumstances will we allow the enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our people.  We will defend the citizens of Israel when the time comes, with all means at our disposal.”

[19] The economic cost of operating it would in any case be impossible in a truly wide-ranging confrontation, which the Home Front Command chiefs occasionally mention in an interview with the press.

[20] The use of open force is clearly in conflict with the Oslo concept. If justice is with our enemies, where do we get the right to fight them and change the situation? And even if we want to change it, we will have to return to the pre-Oslo situation, in which we actually control the territory, and in the process we will also receive international criticism - another threat that the supporters of Oslo have used against their opponents. Israel therefore devotes its efforts to thwarting or prevention, or at most to deterrence, and refrains from taking any offensive action that could significantly change the situation.

[21] So Netanyahu said after his meeting with Arafat in Washington after the events of the Western Wall tunnel in September 1996.

[22] The great promise of Oslo – the warm adoption of the State of Israel by the family of nations - did not take place at all, and the claim that Israel’s concessions to its enemies and neighbors would lead to international legitimacy and appreciation turned out to be the opposite of reality. Even the full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip did not achieve this, but rather the exact opposite. From the stable situation of Israeli rule in Gaza, where the criticism against us was limited, today even the naval blockade we impose on the Strip from the outside in order to prevent the wholesale passage of Iranian weapons into it is perceived by the world as the essence of global evil. Nevertheless, the architects of Oslo continue to argue that it is only the failure to fully implement the Oslo process that is responsible for this.

[23] Even before the abduction and murder of the three youths, police officer Baruch Mizrahi was murdered on the eve of the Seder by a terrorist who was released in the Shalit deal.

[24] Concerned about “international legitimacy” and “fear of harming innocent people,” Israel was careful to warn the population of Gaza in advance of the IDF in such detail and thoroughness that enabled Hamas to know in advance where IDF soldiers were about to arrive and to prepare well for them.

[25] However, unlike the classic case of conquerors in a foreign country, where morality is not at the top of their priorities, We draw  from our viewing ourselves as conquerers all possible moral conclusions, thus sacrificing the lives of our citizens and soldiers to the benefit of the enemy who seeks to destroy us. Such behavior is immoral..

[26] News 2, 31 January 2017

[27] The presence of Zehut Chairman Moshe Feiglin at the same event, and the pressure he then exerted on Knesset members from all coalition factions to respond to the assassination attempt by ascending to the Temple Mount, began the countdown to the end of his tenure as a Likud MK.

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